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We analyzed temporal stability and geographic trends
in cumulative case-fatality rates and average doubling
times of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). In
part, we account for correlations between case-fatality
rates and doubling times through differences in control
measures. Factors that may alter future estimates of case-
fatality rates, reasons for heterogeneity in doubling times
among countries, and implications for the control of SARS
are discussed.
C
oncern over the emergence of severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) has persisted as epidemic continues
in the first months of 2003, despite control efforts. As of
May 12, 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) had
reported 7,447 cases with 552 deaths in >30 countries. The
most affected locations are China, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Viet Nam, Taiwan, and Canada. (Our study focuses on
Canada.) Doubling times (i.e., the period required for the
number of cases in the epidemic to double) and case-fatal-
ity rates (CFRs) are fundamental to the epidemiology and
potential public health impact of SARS. Doubling times
are a measure of the rate of spread of disease and also indi-
cate the magnitude of control efforts required to curtail
spread. Because doubling times change substantially over
the course of an epidemic, current estimates should not be
used to extrapolate into the future.
CFRs of SARS have typically been estimated by divid-
ing the number of deaths by the total number of cases. This
method is sufficient for an advanced epidemic. However,
the method is not accurate at an early stage of an epidem-
ic, particularly when the time from infection to recovery or
death is not brief, relative to the duration of the epidemic,
as is currently true with SARS. The method underesti-
mates the CFR because it does not account for a proportion
of currently infected persons’ dying from the disease. A
more accurate method would be to divide the number of
deaths by the total number of deaths plus the number of
persons who recovered. By applying this method to pub-
licly available WHO data (1), the cumulative CFR esti-
mates appear more stable, relatively constant within a
country (aside from Taiwan, which is in the earliest stage
of its epidemic) but varying considerably among countries
(Figure 1). 
Average overall CFR for all countries increased from
10.4% on April 21 to 14.7% on May 12 (largely attributa-
ble to the sudden rise in CFRs in China and Taiwan). In
countries with few deaths, this estimate of CFR may be a
slight overestimate if the time from infection to death tends
to be shorter than time to recovery. However, recent cohort
data from Hong Kong (2) suggest the opposite, implying
that our crude estimates of CFR may still be underesti-
mates. Such inaccuracies are, however, unlikely to modify
the results of a general comparison of CFRs across coun-
tries. Nevertheless, caution is warranted in comparing
CFRs across countries since differences may exist in the
various surveillance systems that report cases and the num-
ber of persons who recovered.
Figure 1 does not directly provide information on
whether the CFR shows temporal trends in any country as
it plots the average CFR since the beginning of the epi-
demic. Unfortunately, the publicly available WHO data do
not permit a CFR to be estimated over time since cases
reported in one period are not linked to recoveries at the
same or future time. The determination of factors, includ-
ing date of infection, that influence death rates awaits
detailed analyses of cohort data on infected persons. 
We identify an inverse relationship between the average
CFR and the average doubling time for different countries
(Figure 2). (The average doubling time is a cumulative
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Figure 1. Cumulative case-fatality rates for severe acute respirato-
ry syndrome over time.measure reflecting average growth from the beginning of
reported data and is estimated by the length of a time peri-
od divided by the log2 of the relative growth in numbers of
reported cases during the same period; see Appendix.) This
relationship is probably generated by the influence of the
efficacy of control policy affecting both parameters, rather
than a reflection of different characteristics of viral infec-
tiousness and virulence across epidemics. The rapid hospi-
talization of infectious persons is likely to reduce the CFR
and increase the doubling time (by reducing the spread of
SARS). Consistent with this explanation is the successful
containment of a sizable epidemic in Viet Nam and the rel-
atively low CFR and long doubling time there. In contrast,
Canada has the highest CFR and shortest doubling time
(except for Taiwan, where the CFR has yet to reach a
steady state). Stochasticity in personal contacts plays a key
role during the invasion phase of the epidemic. In Toronto,
the stochasticity of social contacts resulted in a second out-
break after public health officials thought that SARS had
been controlled. Transmission also occurred in Toronto
before public awareness of SARS was widespread, result-
ing in delayed hospitalization of the first few patients; this
scenario, in turn, facilitated transmission and may have
elevated death rates (3). Thus, the means of disease intro-
duction may be important in determining early doubling
times and CFR values. These factors, combined with small
sample sizes, may have been the cause of particularly high
CFRs from April 10 to April 15 in Canada. 
Variation in CFRs among countries will arise from dif-
ferences in intensity and speed of medical care, age struc-
ture of the population (older infected patients are more
likely to die [2]), and factors such as coinfection. For
example, the high prevalence of coinfection with other res-
piratory diseases, such as infections caused by Chlamydia
pneumoniae  (4),  C. psittaci, and paramyxoviruses in
China, could increase the CFR there. Likewise, should
SARS spread in Africa, the disease could have a devastat-
ing effect, given its high prevalence of tuberculosis and
HIV/AIDS.
Estimates of CFR may change as polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) assays become more widely used in diag-
nosis (5). Diagnostic tests could identify mild cases that
currently are not reported. Our estimate of the size of the
epidemic would then increase in terms of number of cases,
but the estimates of CFR would decrease. Conversely,
PCR tests might eliminate the diagnosis of SARS in some
suspected cases. Ultimately, accurate estimates of popula-
tion distributions of parameters reflecting the clinical
course of disease will be best provided by follow-up of
clearly defined cohorts of infected persons identified by
appropriate diagnostic procedures. 
As an epidemic declines, the doubling time increases.
Variation in doubling time among countries probably aris-
es from variation in both transmission rates and control
efforts (Figure 3). Transmission rate (with units of time-1)
is determined by the expected number of susceptible per-
sons with whom each infectious person comes into contact
during a time unit in their infectious periods and by the
probability of disease transmission per contact. High-den-
sity population centers, crowded public transportation sys-
tems, and hospital waiting rooms increase the number of
contacts, while personal hygiene affects the probability
that transmission will occur with each contact. In all coun-
tries, seasonal effects may also play a substantial role with
the virus spreading faster in winter. 
In Viet Nam, the doubling time increased over the peri-
od that the epidemic was being controled (Figure 3). The
dramatic drop in doubling time in China in early April cor-
responds to a change in reporting practices (Figure 3).
Similarly, in the United States, a shift in the definition of
SARS to correspond to that recommended by WHO com-
plicates estimation of doubling time. However, the dou-
bling time appears to be relatively long in the United States
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Figure 2. Cumulative case-fatality rate for severe acute respirato-
ry syndrome compared with average doubling time as of May 12,
2003.
Figure 3. Time series of log of average doubling time for severe
acute respiratory syndrome.because most cases are caused by seeding from travel to
Asia, with few cases occurring from local transmission. 
Epidemic models may provide a framework for evalu-
ating alternative control measures. Central to the accurate
parameterization of epidemic models is the reproductive
ratio, R0, which is the average number of secondary cases
generated by one initial infection in a susceptible popula-
tion in the absence of control measures (6). R0 defines a
threshold that determines whether an infection is likely to
spread. If R0 is <1, each infection will not replace itself, on
average, and the disease will likely die out, although in
such cases spatial dynamics, latency, and stochastic varia-
tion may contribute to localized flare-ups of the disease
that may persist for a long time. Thus, R0 also defines the
level of intervention required to contain an epidemic. The
doubling rate can be used to calculate R0, given that, where
γ is the duration of the incubating period, α is the duration
of the symptomatic period, and τ is the doubling time (7).
Accurate characterization of the incubation and sympto-
matic periods is essential to the translation of doubling
times to R0. Typical estimates of the incubation period for
SARS range from approximately 2 to 10 days (median and
mean 5 days) (4,8), whereas the symptomatic period has a
mean (± standard deviation) of 16±8 days (4,8). Recent
data from Hong Kong (2) suggest somewhat longer incu-
bation on average. However, severe infections may be
overrepresented in current estimates, which have been
based largely on persons who have received intensive
medical treatment, another factor that may affect the
symptomatic period. At this point in any of the epidemics,
we are reluctant to use this approach for calculating R0
from doubling times since the latter is confounded by
evolving control policies (e.g., Hong Kong, Toronto); the
most natural epidemic (in Guangdong Province) offers the
least complete data. 
Figure 4 plots the reported case counts in China, togeth-
er with an exponential curve fitted to a smooth version of
the counts (to allow for the discreteness in reports in early
April). The estimated doubling time from this curve is 16.2
(which closely matches the May 3 value for China in
Figure 3 of 16.3; the May 12 doubling time is now 17.7,
since the growth in counts has declined in the 9 days after
May 3). The curve suggests that 502 cases existed in China
on March 17 (with a 95% confidence interval of 468 to
538) (Appendix), which is consistent with underreporting
at that time. Control measures, evolving contact patterns,
stochastic effects, and potential acquired immunity will all
impact this doubling time (equivalently, the growth in case
counts) and  ultimately lead to a flattening of the growth
observed to date. This decline in the rate of growth can be
seen already in the last week of data from China, although
whether this decline is real or due to delayed reporting is
not yet known.
The rapid increase in the number of cases in China sug-
gests an urgent need to control the epidemic in Asia before
it gains further momentum. Containment of an outbreak at
an early stage affords a greater chance of success than does
a later response and clearly puts less strain on the health-
care system. Isolation of cases, infection-control measures
in hospitals, and vigilant surveillance at community and
population levels are imperative. Failing this, SARS could
become endemic in China, particularly if it evolves anti-
genically to evade pre-existing immunity, such that recov-
ered patients could be reinfected, as is the case for influen-
za (9). In this eventuality, international travel would con-
tinually seed new cases in other parts of the world. SARS
reaffirms what we have previously learned from other
infectious diseases, namely that epidemic control is a glob-
al concern and not the problem of one or a few nations. 
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Appendix
Definition of Doubling Time 
The average doubling time from time t0 to time t1is simply 
where N1 and N0 are the number of cases at times t1 and t0, respec-
tively. The units correspond to those used to measure the interval
length t1-t0. For example, if N1=2N0, then the average doubling
time is exactly t1-t0. In Figures 2 and 3, the time t0 (in days) is
always taken to be the earliest time when case counts are avail-
able in WHO data.
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Figure 4. Observed and expected cumulative number of cases of
severe acute respiratory syndrome in China. 
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Figure 2 was obtained by (i) first applying a lowess smooth
function (9) to the observed case counts, (ii) applying least
squares linear fit of the logarithm of the smoothed case counts
against time, and (iii) transforming the fitted line back to the orig-
inal scale. In particular, in (ii) the estimated line is
log(case)=6.2+0.04t 
(where  t=time in days, ranging inclusively from the value 1
[March 17] to value 57 [May 12])
Prediction of Cases with 95% Confidence 
Interval for March 17, 2003
The predicted confidence interval for Y(new) is the following:
The estimates and confidence intervals are then transformed back
to the original scale.
On March 17, 2003, the estimated case is 502, with a 95%
confidence interval (468 to 538); note that this confidence inter-
val is for the actual number of cases on March 17.
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